mental as they are to legislative studies, to social choice theory, and to political theory more generally, are taken up by Laruelle and Valenciano in their work Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power. They do so first theoretically and on the basis of a clever division between two types of committees. They then demonstrate how this applies to the European Union. This is a technical volume, but the authors do make a valiant effort to connect it to contemporary and practical politics. It is an important work.
Much of social choice theory has been concerned with understanding and measuring power within committees, power being broadly understood as the ability to realize committee outcomes consistent with one's preferences. To this end, power indices are computed with the hope of identifying which actors generally and0or in particular situations have the greatest ability to realize their desired outcome. But, generally speaking, these measures have been developed without identifying what kind of a decision a committee is allowed to make. Rather, these indices are mostly concerned with decision rules. This is particularly problematic in committees with unevenly sized groups.
The noteworthy contribution of Laruelle and Valenciano is to draw a distinction between two different types of committees. "Take-it-or-leave-it" committees are those that vote a decision up or down with no chance to bargain within the committee about choices or the content of those choices.~One is actually hard pressed to come up with mandates of this type within legislative committees. An example outside of a legislature would be when citizens are in a referendum asked to vote up or down on a government policy and different groups are given different weights!. By contrast, "bargaining committees" are those that allow members to choose between several different arrangements and can modify the content of proposals before voting.
By making a distinction between these two types of committees, Laruelle and Valenciano are able to draw out the shortcomings of existing power indices, as they work very differently for these types of committees. Laruelle and Valenciano argue that they work poorly in both cases. In the first case, these indices tell us very little in take-it-or-leave-it committees while in bargaining committees they are effectively indistinguishable from game-theoretic type measures of the probability of being decisive.
The book is well arranged. It opens with a review of notation and preliminary concepts. Laruelle and Valenciano then review some seminal papers in social choice while highlighting the ambiguities therein. These two chapters would provide any interested reader or graduate class with a good introduction to social choice and collective decision making. They next examine their two committee types in a chapter each and follow this with showing how these two different models apply to the European Union. This is the principal place where more could be done. In the first place, they struggle to demonstrate that decision making in the EU ever approximates a take-it-or-leave-it committee structure. This must discount the value of their model, if only slightly. Second, Laruelle and Valenciano could better demonstrate how the insights they generate about the practical distributions of power within the current EU lead to the actual policy outcomes that we see. That they do not discounts the value of the volume but only slightly.
All told, this is an interesting, informative and potentially important volume. It is occasionally uneven in its presentation and perhaps strained in its application. But it is also very clever and maybe even seminal in its distinction between extreme committee types. For those continuing the work of collective decision making and voting rules, this is the proposal over which they must now bargain. It must be taken and not left.
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